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Abstract 
In this thesis, I examine friendship as a multi-faceted phenomenon and finally 
present a "sacred face" of friendship. Drawing mainly on the works of Aristotle and 
Montaigne, I identify several features commonly associated with friendship including: 
goodwill, affection, the particularity of the friend, and the certainty of the friend's 
affection. Combining these features, I give an account of the activity of giving a gift of 
affection. This gift need not take on any particular form, but can be present in the way 
something is done for the friend. Using Mircea Eliade's account of sacred experience, I 
build on to this notion of giving a gift the concept of sacred experience to make it a ritual. 
Gift-giving as a ritual is an interruption in the lives of friends. This interruption 
marks a new way of experiencing the world, and the friends are responsible for that way 
of being in the world. Through gift-giving the friends experience the world together as an 
"us," and through the gift of affection they can return to that way of being. 
By using Claudia Card's account of responsibility, I detail how gift-giving is both 
a spontaneous taking of responsibility as well as a caretaking form of responsibility. By 
becoming twofold responsible for the friendship, the friends experience the world as an 
"us;" as a composite entity where their selves mingle. The being an "us" by way of 
giving the gift of affection is at the heart of the sacred face of friendship. 
"For the rest, what we ordinarily call friends and friendships are nothing 
but acquaintanceships and familiarities formed by some chance or 
convenience, by means of which our souls are bound to each other. In the 
friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend with each other so 
completely that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it 
again. If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be 
expressed, except by answering: Because it was he, because it was 1." 
Michel de Montaigne1 
Preface 
I will examine friendship as it is experienced rather than fitting it into some larger 
theoretical work. The goals I set for myself in this essay are then somewhat outside of expected 
norms in philosophy papers, and therefore I should mention them before starting the essay 
proper. 
My first goal is to be thought provoking. I want to challenge readers to think more deeply 
about how their friendships are meaningful. I am not trying to define friendship or defeat a 
definition of it through argument. To the extent that readers are able to gain a deeper 
understanding of their friendships from this essay, this essay is successful. 
My second goal is to preserve a reverent attitude toward friendship. I assume friendship's 
value; I do not set out to prove it. To this end, I take as my starting point the common notion of 
"holding something sacred." Moving beyond the mere phrase, I consider Mircea Eliade's 
phenomenological account of the sacred. In so doing I generate an etymology of the word 
"sacred" that is meant to uncover something that is present in the phenomenon but inaccessible 
in our everyday encounters with sacredness. The success of the second goal is measured by how 
able I am able to produce a work that is familiar with the way we talk about friendships and does 
1 Montaigne, Michele de, "Of Friendship" from Frame, Donald M. (trans.) The Complete Works (New York: 
Everyman's Library 2003) 169 henceforth "Montaigne, 'Friendship'" 
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not reduce the beauty of friendship. Unless I am providing exegesis, I try to avoid overly 
technical language. 
Finally, this discussion of friendship is not bound by a particular notion of love or 
affection. I will not strictly maintain the Greek distinctions between philia, eros, and agape. I do 
not attend to these distinctions despite the fact that several of the philosophers' works I examine 
do maintain such distinctions. Philia is a concept that includes more relationships than our 
concept of friendship such as business relationships and the relationship between host and guest, 
but is close enough that it is translated as "friendship." Eros is an erotic love, and is often 
characterized as an intense, passionate desiring of the beloved. Finally, agape, which is "a kind 
of love that does not respond to the antecedent value of its object but instead is thought to create 
value in the beloved," is the kind of love most often associated with Christian love. 2 I am 
making an assumption that the relationships people have that involve affection will sometimes 
exhibit features of different types of love simultaneously or at different times. 
Introduction: Faces of Friendship 
I intend to show that there is a distinct sacred face of friendship that has not been 
properly explicated in the philosophical literature on friendship. The sacred face of friendship is 
a way of being in the world for the friends; it is being an "us." This way of being in the world is 
brought about by the act of giving the gift of affection. By drawing on several features 
commonly associated with friendship, I will detail the activity of giving the gift. I will continue 
to develop this activity as a sacred ritual. Finally, by looking at different senses of responsibility, 
I will give an account of how the ritual of gift-giving affection is a transformative act that makes 
the friends an "us." 
2 From The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available online http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/friendship/ 
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Instead of examining the general notion of friendship in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, I will be using the concept of "family resemblance.,,3 A family resemblance approach 
is one that focuses on different features in different contexts rather than finding a rigid definition. 
Friendship is generally a relationship that may have one or more of a number of features, none of 
which is individually necessary. Some features of friendship may appear more frequently than 
others or may be considered more important than others. I take these features of friendship to be 
"central," even though they are not individually necessary. It is in light of these central features 
of friendship that I will present sacred friendship. 
Throughout this paper, I will be referring to different accounts of friendship as "faces of 
friendship." 4 A face of friendship is a collection of family resemblance features that describe a 
type of friendship that a person may have. Each individual face of friendship may have necessary 
and sufficient conditions with additional peripheral features of friendship added on. Sacred 
friendship differs significantly from other faces of friendship, but it is still composed of some 
common features associated with friendship in general. The sacred face of friendship is 
significantly different from other faces of friendship because of the presence of sacred 
experience in sacred friendship, which is built on to the features of goodwill, affection, 
particularity of the beloved, and the certainty of the friend's love. 
The goal of this section ofthe essay is to explain some common features of friendship by 
turning to the work of past philosophers. I tum to Plato's Lysis, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 
and Montaigne's "Of Friendship." By looking at what past philosophers have said of friendship, 
3 "Family resemblance" was a term made by Ludwig Wittgenstein. From The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
available online at http://plato.stanford.edulentries/wittgenstein/ under the heading "3.4 Language-games and Family 
Resemblance." In Wittgenstein's work, the notion of family resemblance appeared in Philosophical Investigations. 
4 In Young, Iris Marion, "The Five Faces of Oppression," in Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, 1990), 
Young uses the phrase "faces of oppression," in a similar fashion. She simultaneously highlights the differences in 
the way people have been oppressed and notes the unity in their oppression while trying to not be reductive of 
particular cases. 
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I will be able to sort through some of the features associated with friendship and build the 
presentation of sacred friendship on this foundation. The specific features I will use are affection, 
goodwill, the particularity of the beloved, and the certainty of the friend's love for us. 
Now I will turn to several faces of friendship to find what features are commonly taken to 
be associated with general friendship. I will take as the core text of this section one that construes 
the notion of friendship broadly but does not stray from some of our common intuitions about 
friendship. This text is Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, where he divides friendships into 
friendships of utility, pleasure, and true character friendships. To e contextualize Aristotle's 
work, we will begin with Plato's Lysis. After examining Aristotle and some of his 
commentator's, I will turn to Montaigne's account of friendship to further elaborate the four 
features of friendship that I will be using in presenting the sacred face of friendship. 
After elaborating on the notions of goodwill, affection, the particularity of the beloved 
and the certainty of the friend's affection for us, I will outline what sacred experience is. My 
account of sacred friendship is building up to how the activity of giving affection in sacred 
friendship changes the way the friends are in the world. Because of the gift-giving of affection, 
the friends become an "us" rather than a "you and me." 
Plato and Instrumental Friendship 
In Plato's Lysis, we see a presentation of friendship that is entirely constituted by the 
notion of usefulness. 5 As a face of philia, the centrality of the notion of usefulness applies to all 
relationships that humans are a part of, even ones with non-humans. For Plato, the same 
usefulness a person may have for medicine when they are sick is at play in interpersonal 
relationships. 
5 Plato, Lysis from C.D.C. Reeve (ed.) Plato on Love (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 2006), henceforth 
"Plato, Lysis" 
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Lysis begins with Socrates challenging Lysis's assumptions about his parents love for 
Lysis; Socrates argues that Lysis is only lovedfor something rather than unconditionally.6 When 
Lysis's friend Menexenus joins the conversation, Socrates shifts from looking at parental 
friendship to the friendship a sick person has with a doctor (and a sick body has with medicine). 
Socrates argues that a person only loves someone or something instrumentally. The patient is 
only a friend of the doctor and medicine for the sake of health. 7 From this, Socrates further 
argues that the true friend is the final thing in which other friendships terminate. The final friend 
would be the one that is loved intrinsically rather than instrumentally.s Socrates finishes this line 
of thought by claiming that we are not final friends with other human beings, but rather the 
good.9 
Lorraine Smith Pangle finds this view of friendship problematic because of the 
relationship Socrates describes between friendship and goodness. Pangle takes particular issue 
with Socrates painting a picture of goodness as merely a remedy to deficiencies. She does not 
like the fact that Socrates presents happiness as an absence of the evils, deprivations, and 
ignorance that seem to be "fundamental facts of life."lo Pangle argues that in the Lysis, Socrates 
advances the claim that not only does all human love start in neediness, but it begins, ends, and is 
wholly driven by it.llPangle observes that the conception of human desires presented in the Lysis 
fails to distinguish between pursuing something to be free of a want, i.e. instrumentally, and 
desiring things that are "good in themselves for us," as an end. 12 As a result Socrates only 
presents cases of the former kind of desire. To distinguish between the two, Pangle characterizes 
6 Plato, Lysis 21 Oc2-8 
7 Ibid. 219al-219b2 
8 Ibid. 220a9-220b2 
9 Ibid. 220b8-220d6 
10 Pangle, Lorraine Smith, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship (New York: Cambridge University Press 
2003) 24 henceforth "Pangle, Friendship" 
II Ibid. 20 
12 Ibid. 30 
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the desire for things that are "good in themselves" ŸĚa kind of desire that we want, whereas no 
one desires to be sick or poor or disabled. 13 
The Socratic notion of friendship, with its focus on utility and overcoming ills, does not 
present a very flattering face. Emphasizing the centrality of utility in the Socratic face of 
friendship, David Brink argues that Socrates closes the possibility that a friend could be loved for 
her own sake. 14 This is because on the Socratic notion of goodness, virtue is understood to be 
merely instrumental in trying to attain happiness, which is only a negation of ills. Each ill is an 
obstacle that gets in the way of a starting point of contentment. Virtues are the character traits 
that one has that helps one overcome these obstacles. 
One could phrase the thesis of the Lysis as being that one never loves the friend, but only 
her qualities insofar as those qualities can help one in overcoming one's own obstacles. A 
friend's character is a placeholder for virtue that one wishes to utilize. Brink writes: "Socrates 
believes that the lover values his beloved for the lover's own eudaimonia, as Socrates must ifhe 
is to reconcile friendship with his eudaimonism.,,15 Under this notion of friendship, a person only 
has friends to ensure that she can overcome any setbacks that may come her way. 
The thesis of the Lysis is a challenge. Socrates put forth a definition of all friendships, 
and that definition is meant to be the final word. Although we disagree with Socrates' argument, 
understanding this challenge helps in understanding Aristotle's account of friendship. Aristotle's 
account of friendship is not an isolated set of faces, but is actually a response to the face of 
friendship presented in the Lysis. The main difference in the accounts of Socrates and Aristotle is 
that Aristotle maintains that a person or a thing can be loved for her own or its own sake rather 
13 Ibid. 30-1 
14 Brink, David O. "Eudaimonism, Love, and Political Community," Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation (1999) 
257-8 henceforth Brink, "Eudaimonism" 
15 Ibid. 
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than merely instrumentally.16 Aristotle acknowledges that there are friendships entirely rooted in 
utility, and he concedes that desire plays an important role in all friendships. It is the valuing of 
the friend as an end, though, that helps make Aristotle's account of character friendship so 
important. 
Aristotle and Character Friendship 
Focusing on utility as the root of all friendship does not quite capture what most of us 
have in mind when we think of the friendships we hold sacred. In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle 
presents three faces of friendship based on the objects worthy of affection: utility, pleasure, and 
the goodY In friendships of utility people are friends in virtue of what they give one another, 
and often the friends are different so that they may give each other different things. This would 
be like a friendship between a customer and the neighborhood butcher who are on friendly terms 
and know each others' names. But if the customer were to run out of money or the butcher were 
to run out of meat, they would cease to have a relationship. Aristotle writes "Now usefulness is 
not something permanent, but differs at different times. Accordingly, with the disappearance of 
the motive for being friends, the friendship, too, is dissolved, since the friendship owed its 
existence to these motives."ls Friendships of pleasure are similar insofar as the friendship is 
based on something the participants get out of each other, namely pleasure. Often what one finds 
pleasant can change quickly and these pleasure friendships can dissolve easily. 19 The third type 
of friendship is friendship which is "between good men who are alike in excellence or virtue," 
and this type is called "perfect" or "true" friendship.20 Unlike the previous two types of 
friendship, the affection in true friendship is not based on what each friend gets out of the other, 
16 Ibid. 34 and Book I of Aristotle, NE 
17 Aristotle, NE 1153b18-9 
18 Ibid. 1 1 56a22A 
19 Ibid. 1 1 56a33-6 
20 Ibid. 1 156b6 
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but is based on each other's goodness which is intrinsic to the person. Here, "intrinsic" means 
"not incidental" and is a feature of who someone is. 21 
I agree with Aristotle that goodwill is a feature of most friendships. Unlike Aristotle I do 
not think it is a necessary and sufficient condition for friendship as such.22 However, since 
goodwill is a feature of gift-giving, I will examine it closely here. As Rosalind Hursthouse points 
out, even though only in true friendship do the friends wish for each others' goods for their own 
sakes, all three of them involve some form of goodwill?3 A utility or pleasure friendship allows 
that the friends wish for each other's well-being beyond what they get out of each other. 
However, the friends in utility and pleasure friendships only wish each other well in the way in 
which they love one another.24 I can hope that my butcher does well outside of getting me a good 
deal on the meat I buy and beyond being able to remain my butcher; I may wish him happy 
holidays when the occasion calls for it, or sympathize when something in his life goes awry, like 
a divorce. It is still true, though, that I am only friends with him insofar as he is my butcher; and 
if I were to stop visiting his shop my goodwill for him would dissolve shortly after. 
While Aristotelian character friends have affection based in each other's goodness, it is 
unclear if they love each other for their own sakes since the basis of that love does not make 
essential reference to the friend. One could still ask whether the beloved is loved for herself or 
just for her virtues. It is on precisely this issue that Brink argues against Vlastos that it is still 
possible in a eudaimonist framework to love someone for her own sake.25 Brink claims that in 
order to account for the friend qua friend, one must attach significance to the historical 
21 Ibid. 1156b7-10 
22 Ibid. 1155b32-3 
23 Hursthouse, Rosalind, "Aristotle for Women Who Love Too Much" Ethics 117 (January 2007) 328 henceforth 
"Hursthouse, 'Women'" 
24 Ibid. 
25 Brink, "Eudaimonism" 
- 9-
relationship between the friends, and Aristotle does just this in claiming that friends must live 
together and share their thoughts and discussion,z6 
The second feature of friendship I will examine is affection. As I write about it, affection 
is an attitude we have toward someone. "Affectionately" is a way actions are done. Affection-
giving is the making manifest a fondness or love of someone. Affection-giving is not strictly 
internal. It is public and perceptible. I can affectionately joke around with a friend, share a meal 
with her, challenge her to reflect on something, or give her a hug. What counts as giving varies 
across contexts. Affection-giving can manifest ph ilia, eros, or agape and in any combination. 
Coupled with the notion of goodwill, affection requires a concern for the friend for her own sake, 
which is different from a mere extension of the lover's own interests. 
To give further characterization of affection and its role in friendship, I will tum to 
Montaigne. For Montaigne, virtue is merely a condition of perfect friendship; it is not what 
constitutes it. 27 Virtue is a coincidence, of which he writes: "So many coincidences are needed 
to build up such a friendship that it is a lot if fortune can do it once in three centuries." [my 
emphasis]28 But this is not the cause of love or affection; Montaigne is very clear in saying that 
giving any reason at all for loving is "to point beyond and away from the friend to something 
else as our highest concern.,,29 It is based on these considerations that Pangle, I think rightly, 
characterizes Montaigne as placing great emphasis in the freedom by which one chooses to 
26 Ibid. 270 and Aristotle, NE 1 1 56b25-9 and 1157b6-7 
27 Pangle, Friendship 65 
28 Montaigne, "Friendship" 165 
29 Pangle's phrase in Pangle, Friendship 65 which echoes in Montaigne, "Friendship" 169-70 where he writes, "It is 
not one special consideration, nor two, nor three, nor four, nor a thousand: it is I know not what quintessence of all 
this mixture, which, having seized my whole will, led it to plunge and lose itself in his; which, having seized his 
whole will, led it to plunge and lose itself in mine, with equal hunger, equal rivalry." 
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become devoted to another, a devotion where one eagerly gives up the liberty and autonomy of 
judgment and action and surrenders it to the will of the friend (which is mutual).3o 
Friendship for Montaigne is a perfect intermingling of selves, rather than an extension of 
the self as it is for Aristotle. By insisting on this perfect intermingling of selves, Montaigne is 
able to bypass an absurdity whereby the friends would be competing to try to be the other's 
benefactor-which would be a strange inversion of priorities, since it would be the beneficiary 
who would oblige the benefactor in allowing her to do good.3! 
The Aristotelian valuation of giving affection over receiving it is what sets up this 
paradox. We can think of two friends at a restaurant who compete and argue to see who pays 
because paying for both meals would be nobler. However, in allowing the other friend to pay for 
her meal, the beneficiary gives the greater gift, which is the opportunity to be virtuous and noble, 
and therefore the beneficiary is nobler; but, in getting to perform the more noble action, it turns 
out the benefactor is allowing the beneficiary to perform the best action and the whole situation 
collapses into absurdity. 
The third member of the family of characteristics associated with friendship that I will 
use builds upon the notion of goodwill. It is the importance placed on the friend qua friend. It is 
her particularity. This is opposed to the friend qua a mere collection of character traits or qua 
someone who is capable of giving benefits. The importance of particularity in friendship, at least 
at first glance, is corroborated by both Montaigne and Aristotle. Montaigne writes of his 
affection for La Boetie, "If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be 
30 Pangle, Friendship 66, 68 
31 Ibid. 69 
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expressed, except by answering: Because it was he, because it was 1. ,,32 There is textual evidence 
in the Nicomachean Ethics that supports this hypothesis regarding the particularity of friendship: 
To be friends with many people, in the sense of perfect friendship, is impossible, 
just as it is impossible to be in love with many people at the same time. For love 
is like an extreme, and an extreme tends to be unique ... Also, one must have 
some experience of the other ŸŤŲVŬŪĚand have come to be familiar with him, and 
that is the hardest thing of all. 3 
The fourth feature of friendship is that of certainty of the friend's affection for us. In 
faces of friendship such as those of utility or pleasure, it always appears at least possible that the 
friend has ulterior motives or in some way does not really wish for the good of her friend. Once 
again, this feature is found in Montaigne and Aristotle. Montaigne writes: "It is not in the power 
of all the arguments in the world to dislodge me from the certainty I have of the intentions and 
judgments of my friend.,,34 Later, Montaigne writes: "not only did I know his soul as well as 
mine, but I should certainly have trusted myself to him more readily than to myself.,,35 Aristotle 
writes, "Also, only the friendship of good men is proof against slander. For a man does not easily 
trust anyone's word about a person whom he has himself tried and tested over a long period of 
time. The friendship of good men implies mutual trust, the assurance that neither partner will 
ever wrong the other. ,,36 
From these four features there is one activity that I would like to draw attention to: gift-
giving. Giving a gift draws upon goodwill because it is given to the friend for the sake of the 
friend. The gift makes essential reference to the friend in her particularity, not because of any 
feature she may have. It is freely given to her regardless of how deserving she may be. The 
giving of a gift is a performative act. This means it requires that the friend acknowledge the gift 
32 Montaigne, "Friendship" 169 
33 Aristotle, NE 1158al1-16 
34 Montaigne, "Friendship" 170 
35 Ibid. 170-1 
36 Aristotle, NE1157a23-4 
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and receive it as a gift; she must be certain it is born out of goodwill and is directed at her. 
Finally, the gift the friend gives to another friend is the gift of affection. It is the way something 
is done. In the following section, I detail that "something" in terms of a sacred ritual. 
Sacred Experience 
There is significant overlap between Aristotle's account of character friendship and my 
account of sacred friendship. No feature of either face of friendship excludes features from the 
other, which makes a clear line of demarcation difficult. The best way to keep separate these two 
faces of friendship is to focus on what each face takes to be the central feature. In Aristotle's 
character friendship, virtue is the central feature; and character friendship can exist without 
sacred experience. In sacred friendship, sacred experience is the central feature; and sacred 
friendship can exist without the friends being virtuous. Further, it is possible to have a hybrid 
face of friendship, in which both friends are virtuous and they have sacred experiences together. 
In this section, I outline Mircea Eliade's account of sacred experience and show how it 
applies to friendship.37 The presence of sacred experience is itself necessary for the sacred face 
of friendship. I begin by discussing "sacredness" and my secular use of the concept. 
Traditionally, sacredness has been coupled with the over-awing presence of the divine. 
Here I do not intend to claim that friendships are experiences of the divine, nor am I insinuating 
that they are religious. As I use it here, "sacredness" is a manner of experience. It is not the 
content of experience, but rather the way content is perceived and felt. Experience is thought to 
occur within the dimensions of time and space; sacredness is a concept which describes the kind 
of time and space in which an experience occurs. I will now consider three features of sacred 
experience. 
37 Eliade, Mircea, The Sacred and the Profane, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1959) henceforth "Eliade, 
Sacred' 
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The first feature of sacred experience is that it is heterogeneous to the rest of experience, 
which is referred to as "profane." Eliade describes the sacred and profane as being "two modes 
of being in the world, two existential situations assumed by man in the course of his history.,,38 
This means that sacred experiences are qualitatively different from profane experiences, and 
sacred experiences are marked off from profane experiences through thresholds. "The threshold 
is the limit, the boundary, the frontier that distinguishes and opposes two worlds-and at the 
same time the paradoxical place where those two worlds communicate, where the passage from 
the profane to the sacred world becomes possible.,,39 Physical spaces that are sacred have literal 
thresholds which are meant to impress and awe the person who crosses through it. Old Catholic 
churches have huge, ornate doors to pass through, and the theme of big and impressive remains 
throughout the church experience. 
Sacred activities are marked off from profane activities by a threshold of activities, by 
engaging in rituals and rites.4o The rituals that constitute the giving of affection create a "friend 
time." The friends become an "us" rather than a "you" and "me." Each time we are together with 
the friend, giving each other affection, we enter that same kind oftime. The threshold of entering 
sacred "friend time" can be a handshake, a hug, or even a shared smile. Exiting friend time is 
also often marked with a clear ritual, such as saying "1 love you" at the end of a conversation. 
Unlike other greetings and goodbyes, these are not simply ways to respond to another person. 
Rather they mark a difference in a way of being for the friends; these greetings and goodbyes 
mark the merging together and splitting apart of the friends. 
There are two uniting themes of these "friend time" rituals that build off of features of 
friendship. Sacred rituals involve giving affection and having it mutually known by the friends 
38 Ibid. 14 
39 Ibid. 25 
40 Ibid. 68 
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that each of them care about the other for her own sake. Rituals are the actions that manifest the 
friends' affection for one another, and the visible co-performance of these rituals is what makes 
the mutual affection clear. 
The second major feature of sacred experiences is that they are a form of world-making. 
Those who participate in sacred experience are responsible for bringing about a change in the 
world they inhabit. In friendship, we can understand this feature as leaving behind the 
relationship two people had before it was a sacred friendship. The sacred friendship now 
incorporates shared sacred experience which is now the most central feature of the relationship. 
The affection the friends give each other in their shared rituals is both the act that makes the 
friendship what it is as well as the evidence that the friendship is a sacred one. 
It is important to note that in each instantiation of affection, it is simultaneously 
spontaneous, and therefore apparently new, and also the re-instantiation of the same affection, 
and therefore old. Each ritual is the same performance each time rather than a simply repeated 
activity, and by being this same re-making of the friendship, this same re-instantiation, it brings 
back some state of relationship that is equal to itself but heterogeneous to all other relationships. 
We always love our sacred friends in the same way each time we love them. Our love for a 
friend is particular because the friend is particular, and since the basis for that love never changes 
neither does that love. Regardless of what events may happen over the course of a sacred 
friendship, that the two friends are friends in the same way remains true. Other affection we have 
for non-sacred friends can change depending on our mood or if they have done something for us. 
Our love for non-sacred friends may change when the friend changes even a little. The stability 
of our love for the sacred friend is not brought on by circumstance but by the simple presence of 
the friend as we engage in shared activity and conversation with that friend. 
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The final feature of sacred experience is that it centers. On one hand, sacred experience is 
central; it is already structured and placed within our experiences of the world in general. On the 
other hand it actively centers; it structures further experience. As Eliade writes, "the discovery or 
projection of a fixed point-the center-is equivalent to the creation of the world.,,4! 
A sacred friendship is a relationship we may find at the center of our relationships. To 
further the space metaphor, sacred friendships are the ones where we are closest to the friend; 
where we are most affectionate. Sacred friendships may be the friendships from which other 
friendships we have derive their meaning precisely because the high intensity of affection make 
the friendship appear "friendliest." Sacred friendships can be the ones that appear to be most 
truly friendship. They seem to be the most real. Aristotle asserts roughly the same claim about 
character friendships.42 For him, character friendships are the form from which other friendships 
derive their meaning based on how similar they are to character friendships. 
Sacred friendships center our understanding of other relationships by providing a 
paradigmatic case of friendship and affection; they are often the pinnacle of our joy. 
Furthermore, sacred friendships help us prioritize conflicting obligations to different people. 
Aristotle devotes the entirety of chapter 2 in Book IX to the role of friendship whenever we have 
conflicting obligations; the title of the chapter is "Conflicting obligations.,,43 
Sacred Experience as Made and Discovered 
Now I will tum our attention to a tension in sacred experience. Sacred experience is 
simultaneously experienced as both a discovery and as a making. We find ourselves with sacred 
friendships, which suggests that the friendships are something independent of us. As Eliade 
4l Eliade, Sacred 22 
42 Aristotle, NE 115Sb3-S 
43 Aristotle, NE pages 24S-50. Exactly how friendship affects competing obligations is a matter of context. Aristotle 
comments on this as well writing, "Surely, to draw an exact line of demarcation in all these cases is not an easy 
matter." (116421-S) 
- 16-
writes, sacredness is discovered because sacred places rely on a sign to mark what should be 
sacred. "Often there is no need for a theophany or hierophany properly speaking; some sign 
suffices to indicate the sacredness of a place.,,44 In the discussion of how sacred experiences 
"center," I mentioned how sacred experience is already central. Sacred experience necessarily 
relies on an interruption. It is from this interruption of the sacred sign that we organize our 
experience. Upon receiving the gift of affection from the friend as a sign, we build our friendship 
around it. Further, it is on the foundation of this gift of affection that we come to understand even 
non-sacred friendships. It is interruption of the gift that reveals the possibility for a sacred 
friendship. 
For sacred friends, each discovers she has received of a gift or generosity in the form of 
affection. Regardless of the motive of the person who first gave the gift, the beneficiary can still 
accept the act as though it were a gift. It is not generally assumed that people have a deep 
concern for us as individuals for our own sakes; and so the presentation of a gift, which I am 
presenting here as a combination of affection and goodwill, is seen as a dramatic change in the 
previous relationship dynamic. The discovery of someone's concern for us is an interruption 
which changes the way we see the beneficiary. The discovery of affection opens up the 
possibility for a profane relationship to become a sacred one. 
In order to complete the transformation of a profane relationship into a sacred one with 
an isolated receiving of a gift of affection, we then give that same affection to the friend. We act 
generously and for the sake of the friend; we love her for her own sake. If she receives the 
affection as a gift and it provides her with the discovery of someone having genuine concern for 
her, then the transformation of the friendship into a sacred one has begun. Once the friendship 
becomes reciprocal, and both friends acknowledge the gift of the other as a gift of affection, the 
44 Eliade, Sacred 27 
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friendship becomes sacred. Our giving the gift of affection back to the friend is the "making" 
aspect of friendship, which will be the discovery aspect for the friend. What counts as a gift in 
both presentations of it will vary from context to context; and since the friendship is not yet 
sacred when the gift is first presented, it is still open to misinterpretation. Both giving the gift 
and receiving the gift-giving are necessary for the sacred face of friendship. 
In the final section of this essay, I will focus on how the activity of gift-giving affection 
brings about a different way of being in the world for the friends. This section will tie together 
features of friendship and sacred experience as well as Claudia Card's trustee paradigm of 
informal obligation in order to present the friends as being an "us." It is the being an "us" that is 
feature from which the sacred face of friendship derives its meaning. 
Gift-giving and Being an "Us" 
In this section, I will give a brief account of gift-giving based on the four features of 
friendship from the fourth section. The activity of gift-giving as a sacred experience is a 
transformative act; gift-giving makes the friends an "us." In this section, I will be drawing on 
Claudia Card's different senses of taking a responsibility in order to bridge this gap between 
activity and way of being. 45 
As Card writes, there are two different perspectives in dimensions of responsibility. One 
perspective looks backward, focusing on "punishment and reward, praise or blame, excuses, 
mitigation, and so on.,,46 Card's focus is on the second perspective that looks forward and 
"embodies a perspective of agency, focuses on what is not yet completed or does not yet exist.,,47 
Taking responsibility is something someone voluntarily undertakes. The kind of responsibility 
one takes depends on the type of agency, and the type of agency and corresponding 
45 Card, Claudia, The Unnatural Lottery (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1996), henceforth "Card, Lottery" 
46 Ibid. 25 
47 Ibid. 26 
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responsibility I will be focusing on here is that of caretaking. The caretaking sense of 
responsibility is "committing oneself to stand behind something, to back it, support it, make it 
good (or make good on one's failure to do so), and following through.,,48 In addition to the 
caretaking sense of responsibility, I will also be looking at the obligation sense of responsibility 
as it is explained in Card's "trustee paradigm of informal obligation.,,49 
The act of taking responsibility as a caretaker corresponds to the act of giving the gift of 
affection. One makes good on the friendship; she commits herself to her friend. Giving the gift of 
affection in the rituals friends have is an affirmation of the friendship. The gift shows that the 
friends care for each other. By performing these sacred, affectionate rituals, the friends perform 
an act of world-making. Their world is now one in which they are friends, and this is because 
they took responsibility as friends. 
As caretakers in the friendship, the friends do not take responsibility independently of 
each other. Giving affection is a co-performance of a ritual; friends enter sacred time together. 
Without the other friend simultaneously giving affection, there could be no sacred friendship. 
The friends are reliant on each to take responsibility as caretakers. 
The giving of affection is tied to rituals in sacred friendships. It is through the 
affectionate co-performance of rituals that the friends become co-responsible for making the 
friendship sacred. Other relationships may have responsibilities in them, but these differ from the 
ones in sacred friendships. For instance, I have a responsibility to myoid high school buddies to 
show some minimal level of respect and not to act maliciously toward them. If myoid buddies or 
I were to fail to take up these responsibilities, it would make our relationship as buddies next to 
impossible. In sacred friendships, however, responsibilities are not like obligations to avoid some 
48 Ibid. 28 
49 Ibid. 130 
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particular behavior or meet some minimal requirement. Taking up one's responsibility in a 
sacred friendship is the act affriendship itself at the same time it enables the relationship to take 
place. It is by performing the sacredly friendly act that "friend time" begins. 
There is another level of responsibility in the friendship. This form of responsibility 
comes directly from being the object of the gift of affection, and is different from simultaneously 
giving affection to the friend. The presence of the friend's gift generates an informal obligation 
to acknowledge the gift and hold it dear. By accepting the gift of affection one still takes 
responsibility, but now it is the responsibility of accepting an obligation from outside of oneself. 
By giving the gift of affection, one takes responsibility as a caretaker; by receiving the gift of 
affection from the friend and acknowledging it as a gift one becomes a trustee of the friend's 
affection. Card details the trustee paradigm of obligation as the informal paradigm of obligation, 
which is the kind we would think of for a friendship. 50 Accepting the responsibility from such an 
obligation is not like being indebted to another, as in formal obligations; but is rather like 
accepting a deposit and becoming its trustee.51 One allows oneself to become the beneficiary of 
the "deposit," and is informally obligated to be the trustee of the friend's affection. 
Giving affection in sacred friendships is an active response to the friend's presence and 
gives the beloved the opportunity take up our affection and reciprocate. If both friends do not 
take responsibility as caretakers of the friendship, the love of one may go unrequited. But when 
the friend responds affectionately, we affirm our knowledge of the friend as friend. 
There is a tension in the Aristotelian notion of simply giving affection for the sake of the 
friend. This occurs in both Aristotle's character friendships as well as this sacred face of 
friendship. If these faces of friendship involve caring for the friend simply for the sake of caring 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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for the friend, then the friendship should not need to be a reciprocal relationship. Or at least we 
need not know the friendship to be reciprocal. 
Making sense of this tension involves the trustee paradigm of responsibility. In sacred 
friendships, friends become co-responsible for giving affection. This is not an economic 
exchange of benefits, but rather a joining-in of giving affection. It is not enough to say that 
friends give affection one time and then receive it another, back and forth forever; this leads back 
into thinking of friendship as an economy which does not capture the conception many of us 
have of the friendships we hold sacred. Instead, we should think of these two ways of being 
responsible for both friends as inseparable and simultaneous. The friends give the gift of 
affection together at the same time, and they are responsible recipients of the affection of the 
other at the same time. Card's trustee paradigm of responsibility helps describe this gift-giving. 
Accepting a deposit better reflects what it is for the friend to give us affection, and in turn for us 
to give it as well. We, as friends, do not count out how much affection we have in love-reserve 
and then distribute it according to who has asked for it. Rather, we spontaneously make a deposit 
without a regard for future withdrawals. 
Focusing on accepting a deposit as being the paradigmatic act of responsibility is a 
subtle-shift in thinking about the perspectives in friendship. Friendship is generally thought to lie 
in giving affection, andfulfilling one's responsibility is thought to lie in returning the affection. 52 
There is more to be said of how one responds to being the object oflove, however; and the 
trustee paradigm does just that. To elaborate further on being loved, I turn back to the discovery 
feature of sacred experience. 
52 Card talks about the trustee paradigm and debts of gratitude. The difference is particularly important here because 
for her, one fulfills one's responsibility by not giving the benefactor reason to regret her benefaction. This, she 
thinks, preserves the sense of valuing our benefactor as more than merely useful and as well as not something which 
would make the beneficiary feel guilty and impossibly indebted. Card, Ibid. 127-9 
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The experience of receiving affection in such a way that we see the friend expressing 
genuine concern for us for our own sake finds a parallel in the sacred appearance of signs. Signs 
mark something that does not belong in the profane world. Signs interrupt and mark sacred 
space. 53 A physical threshold can act as a sign, insofar as it signals the interruption of profane 
space and the emergence of the sacred. Events as a threshold in time also act as a sign of the 
sacred. When someone shows genuine concern and affection for us, it often comes as a surprise. 
With the possible exception of family members, most people do not do that. They may have 
some passing goodwill for us, as is the case with business associates and leisure-time buddies, 
but we are not such an important part of their lives that they would give us the kind of intense 
affection that characterizes sacred friendships. When our sacred friends say, "I love you," they 
mean it; and it is significantly different from when our other buddies and associates express 
fondness. 
The sign of affection from a friend also seems to match up with how we have come to 
have the friendships we hold sacred. Eliade writes that people seek the sacred, they do not 
choose it. 54 We cannot decide for someone whether she will give us the gift of her affection. We 
can only love her and hope she will love us back so that we can cherish that gift of affection. 
Similarly, we may constantly be on the lookout for friends, and we make efforts toward having 
them; but we cannot simply choose who will be dearest friends. The fact that a friendship comes 
about, or more precisely, seems to get started by something outside of us makes its discovery 
non-arbitrary. In joining in the giving of affection we give that same sign to the other friend. 
The simultaneous giving and receiving of affection for the friends transforms them into 
an "us." The "us" is a complex entity. It has two parts, yet those parts cannot be separated and 
53 Eliade op. cit. 27 
54 Ibid. 28 
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remain a full two parts. By giving affection, the friends become something greater than they 
were individually. Their caretaking of the friendship make them the safekeepers of a love that 
unites them. The end of being an "us" can have just as profound an effect as having become an 
"us." After Montaigne's friend, La Boetie, died, Montaigne wrote, "I was already so formed and 
accustomed to being a second self everywhere that only half of me seems to be alive now. ,,55 
This union is the heart of the sacred face of friendship. 
Conclusion 
Friendship has many faces. Drawing mainly on the works of Aristotle and Montaigne, I 
have identified several features in common including goodwill, affection, the particularity of the 
friend, and the certainty of the friend's affection. Friends make all of these features manifest in 
the activity of giving a gift. This gift need not take on any particular form, but can be present in 
the way something is done for the friend. When friends give each other the gift of affection, it 
can become a ritual. 
Gift-giving as a ritual is an interruption in the lives of friends. This interruption marks a 
new way of experiencing the world, and the friends are responsible for that way of being in the 
world. Through gift-giving the friends experience the world together as an "us," and through the 
gift of affection they can return to that way of being. 
Gift-giving is both a spontaneous taking of responsibility as well as a caretaking form of 
responsibility. By becoming twofold responsible for the friendship, the friends experience the 
world as an "us;" as a composite entity where their selves mingle. The being an "us" by way of 
giving the gift of affection is at the heart of the sacred face of friendship. 
55 Montaigne, "Friendship" 174 
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